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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision
in Boyle v. Clyde Snow & Sessions, 2016 UT App 114, 378 P.3d 98 (the Opinion), which
is attached in Clyde Snow & Sessions, PC Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, Addendum A).
Generally, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant§ 78A-3-102 (1), (2), (3), and (5)
(2016), and Utah R. App. P. 45 and 46, but after a review of the jurisdictional issues in this
matter, Respondent/Appellee Thomas D. Boyle respectfully objects to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, and as such, objects to grant the writ of certiorari.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Issue I: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Petitioner did not

intervene and that no party to the case waived the requirements for formal intervention.

Standard of Review: On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the
decision of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court, for correctness and without deference
to its conclusions of law. In reviewing the court of appeals' opinion, the Supreme Court
adopts the same standard of review used by that court: "(Q]uestions of law are reviewed
for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly
erroneous." Id. (citing Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)).
Furthermore, the interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review
for correctness.

Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, ,r 5, 989 P.2d 1073.

Issue II: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Petitioners

arguments regarding its status as an "interpleader party" were inadequately briefed and
did not demonstrate such a status.

Standard of Review: Same as above.
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Issue III: If Petitioner did not acquire party status, whether this Court can
acquire jurisdiction via a petition for writ of certiorari to reverse or vacate a Court of
Appeals decision that purported to declare a district courts judgment void
notwithstanding its concession of a lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Standard of Review: This is an issue of law which should be reviewed for
correctness. "Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law that
can be raised for the first time on appeal. Utah Down Syndrome Found Inc. v. Utah

Down Syndrome Ass'n, 2012 UT 86,293 P.3d 241.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Statute: Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 (perfecting and enforcing attorneys liens and
intervention)
Utah R. Civ. P. 3 (commencement of actions), 4 (process); 5 (service and filing of
pleadings); 22 (interpleaders); 24 (intervention).
,
Utah Constitution: Article 1, Section 7. (due process)
U.S. Constitution: U.S. CONST. amend. V., amend. XIV. (due process)

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2007, fifteen-year-old Caleb Jensen died while participating in a wilderness

therapy program. His mother, Dawn Woodson, retained Clyde Snow to represent her in a
wrongful death action. Boyle was lead counsel on the case. Woodson signed a
contingency-fee agreement with Clyde Snow, that if discharged, Clyde Snow would be
"compensated for the reasonable value of the Firm's services."

After the agreement was signed, Boyle was told by senior partners at Clyde Snow
to make the case his "night job." In February of 2010, he was pressured by management
to settle the case against Woodson' s wishes, who wanted the case prepared for trial. In
April of 2010, after management declined to approve any kind of budget for the case to
take depositions and prepare the case for trial, Boyle's salary draw was ended, effectively
terminating him. In June 20 I 0, three years after the case began, Boyle left Clyde Snow
and joined Prince Yeates, and Woodson opted to have her case go with him. Clyde Snow
filed a notice of its attorney lien, but made no request for fees and never motioned to
intervene.

While he was with Prince Yeates, Boyle continued to represent Woodson until the
case settled on May 30, 2013, when Woodson and CEC informed the district court that
they had reached a settlement agreement to voluntarily dismiss their case and they
4

successfully moved to vacate the trial dates. In early June, the defendants moved to
dismiss the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. But in late June, Clyde Snow filed a restated
notice of its lien and objected to the dismissal of the underlying action until Clyde
Snow's attorney's lien was resolved. Clyde Snow had yet to make a request for payment
to Woodson, and allow 30 days to pass without the request being satisfied before
intervening as required in Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 and Rule 24.

But the court held a telephonic hearing regarding the defendants' motion to
dismiss in July 2013, and addressed Clyde Snow's objection to dismissal. During the
hearing, Blake S. Atkin, on behalf of Boyle and Prince Yeates, expressed the intent to
object to Clyde Snow's attorney lien. Shortly after he first spoke, he was disconnected
and his call dropped, but no one realized it until later. CEC pointed out that Clyde Snow
had not followed Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 (4) 'which [Clyde Snow] has not ... done yet,
or by filing a separate legal action.'
They ultimately expressed that they thought it would be a lot fairer to the
defendants to dismiss this action, and to have Clyde Snow file a separate suit against
Prince Yeates or Boyle. Clyde Snow responded that it should not have to forgo its option
to intervene, although under Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 and Rule 24, Clyde Snow did not
have that option.
Despite objections from counsel and Mr. Atkin being dropped from the call, the
court ruled it would dismiss Woodson' s claims and keep the case open for the limited
5

purpose of resolving Clyde Snow's attorney lien. It became clear that Mr. Atkin had been
disconnected by this point, but the court ordered the claims dismissed and ordered a
portion of the settlement funds held in trust until further order of the court. It ordered
Prince Yeates and Clyde Snow to file briefs regarding their positions on the attorney lien
(Position Statements) and ordered them to undergo mediation. The written order after the
hearing also added that no other briefing would be allowed, including, presumably, not
any briefing would be allowed from Woodson.
But soon after the order, on August 9, 2013, Atkin filed a notice of appearance for
Woodson and filed a petition to nullify Clyde Snow's lien, arguing that Clyde Snow
failed to follow the statutory requirements for perfecting a lien. She also argued Clyde
Snow had not properly intervened as a party in the action and thus had not invoked the
court's jurisdiction to enforce the lien. Woodson did not participate further in the case

.

with the exception of a declaration from that stated she believed Clyde Snow had not
been willing to fulfill its contractual obligations to her.
After mediation failed, Prince Yeates filed a motion asking to interplead the funds,
R. at 6325, naming Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Matt Wiese as the only claimants. 1
The record shows Prince Yeates had given Boyle an assignment of rights
regarding its contingency fee agreement with Woodson, and his claim to the funds was
based on that assignment. R. at 5082.

1 Matthew

Wiese and Boyle had a separate agreement where Boyle would pay Wiese.
6

The court granted Prince Yeates' s motion and the funds were deposited with the
court. After the funds were interpleaded, on April 14, 2014, Clyde Snow filed a
document, titled 'First Amended Complaint Regarding Entitlement to Interpled Funds
and Response to Any Crossclaim,' asserting its claim to the settlement funds. R. at 5444.
On April 28, 2013, Boyle moved to dismiss Clyde Snow's purported complaint because it
failed to intervene as required by rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 54675468. The district court denied Boyle's motion, concluding that Clyde Snow was a
'proper interpleader party' (See ,r10 of the Court of Appeals Opinion) and any procedural
objection regarding the requirement to file a formal motion to intervene had been
resolved by prior court orders' and 'the establishment of an interpleader' account. R. at
6524.
The court ultimately awarded all of the interpleaded funds to Clyde Snow.
Boyle appealed. R. at 6331.
The Court of Appeals appropriately declined to hear the merits and arguments of
the district courts findings for lack of jurisdiction stating Boyle had no appeal of right. It
held that under Utah Code and Rule 24, Clyde Snow had failed to properly intervene in
the underlying wrongful death case or file a separate action, that the record showed it
never filed a motion to intervene in the underlying suit, that it improperly objected after
settlement which made its objection untimely even if it could be understood to be a
motion to intervene, and that the actual parties to the underlying case did not waive the
requirements of intervention as they objected and resisted Clyde's efforts to participate in
7

the case, which had no further pending actions to participate in.
The record showed the interpleader was not a complaint under Rule 22, but a
continuation of the underlying case and Clyde Snow, Boyle, and PYO were not parties to
that action. The Court of Appeals determined all post-judgments of the district court
were void, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and reversed and remanded
back to the district court.

SUMMARY OF THE ARUGMENT

Clyde Snow's lien is a house with no foundation. There was no intervention, and
no waiver. With no intervention, the case was not left open to include an interpleader
without a complaint and with only one "proper interpleader party." With no interpleader,
there were no findings by the district court and no disbursement of interpleader funds to
Clyde Snow. All the post-judgment motions, filings, orders, and findings were void
because there was no jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction, like a set of dominoes, it all
collapses. The court of appeals was correct. Boyle was not a party, and could not appeal
the findings of the district court as an appeal of right because all the post-judgment orders
of the district court were void. There was nothing to appeal. The district court correctly
and properly did not rule on the merits or arguments of Boyle's claims regarding the
findings of the district court. The district court lacked jurisdiction to do that. But in
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reviewing the record for jurisdiction, the court recognized the void judgments of the
district court, and correctly declared them void. The Supreme Court cannot now grant a
writ of certiorari and gain jurisdiction of no jurisdiction.

A. Waiver/Intervention
In a review of its jurisdiction in this matter, the court of appeals correctly

determined there was a voluntary dismissal of the case between Woodson and CEC.
Clyde Snow did not file a motion to intervene as a party in the case under Rule 24 and
there was no waiver of the parties to allow Clyde Snow to participate. Because of the
voluntary dismissal, there were no further actions between the parties to participate in.
The only reason the district court had not closed out the case was because of Clyde
Snow's improper objection.
The court of appeals correctly determined there was no proper intervention a by
either Clyde Snow, Boyle, or PYG, they were not parties in the underlying action between
Woodson and CEC, and had no right to participate. Because the true parties had
voluntarily ended their disputes, the district court had no further jurisdiction over them.
But the district court, after receiving Clyde Snow's objection, arranged a short phone call
to discuss the objection. Counsel objection to Clyde Snow's participation stating the lien
was not valid, and stating Clyde Snow had not properly intervened by following Utah
Code Ann.§ 38-2-7. The attorney who was presenting PYG and Boyle in the hearing
was disconnected from the call early-on. But even knowing that, the district court
9

ordered the claims of the parties dismissed, and the case left open to address Clyde
Snow's lien, despite no objections and no waiver. And with no intervention, and no
waiver, everything that came after was void.

B. Interpleader
The Court of Appeals was correct in including the interpleader in the void, postjudgment actions of the district court. Even on its face, the interpleader was not properly
filed as a complaint under Rule 22, there was no plaintiff, no defendants, and no
summons, and no filing fee paid. In addition to Rule 22, as authority for filing the
interpleader, which was not followed, PYG and the district court claimed the district
court's July 2013 orders were the basis of the authority to establish the interpleader. The
district court said: The trial court erred in its July 15, 22 and July 31, 2013 Orders (R. at
4677),(R. 4683-4686) and (R. at 4687-4689) for its legal authority and jurisdiction to
decide CS's Entitlement to the lnterplead Funds:
The Court: "I'm referring to the orders of this Court entered last July in which the
Court specifically held the case open, quote, 'for the sole and limited purpose of
deciding the attorney's lien of the law firm of Clyde, Snow and Sessions." (R. at
6524), Page 28, lines 23-25, and page 29, lines 1-2.

PYG was not a proper stakeholder and did not have control of the funds, because the
court ordered the funds held before the interpleader.
In addition, Woodson, who had never disclaimed interest in the funds, and who
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Clyde Snow stated in its lien was the "owner of the funds,"2was not included as a
potential claimant in the interpleader. The district court named Clyde Snow as the only
"proper interpleader party," and that the only claimants to the fund were Clyde Snow
and PYG, but PYG had acquiesced. Boyle was never considered a proper interpleader
party or claimant by the district court and his assignment of rights from PYG was
extinguished by the very filing of the motion to interplead funds.

C. Jurisdiction
Because of the post-judgment void motions and orders of the district court, the
Court of Appeals correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits and
arguments of Boyle and Clyde Snow in the district court's findings. Because a review
of record for jurisdiction found the void judgments made by the district court, the court
of appeals declared them void, dismissed the appeal without ruling on the merits and
arguments, and reversed and remanded to the district court.

ARGUMENT

I. INTERVENTION
The first issue on certiorari asks:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Petitioner did not
intervene and that no party to the case waived the requirements for formal
intervention.
2

See Clyde Snow's Second Restated Lien, R. at 4925-4929, page 2B.
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The Court of Appeals correctly determined that Petitioner Clyde Snow failed to
intervene in the action in the court below and that no party in the case waived the
requirements of the law for proper intervention. Testimony during the evidentiary
hearing make it clear that Clyde Snow failed to make a demand for payment from
Woodson until December 10, 2013, six months after her case settled. R. at 6525. It is
also undisputed that Clyde Snow failed to properly perfect its lien by following the legal
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-2-7.

In addition, Clyde Snow did not attempt to take any action in the case below until
after the case had already concluded, thus, failing to comport with the requirements
of Rule 24 and Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7(5). In an attempt to remedy these defects,
Clyde Snow now claims that their last minute "objection" to the parties' agreement to
settle and dismiss the lawsuit qualifies as a formal intervention in the case. Realizing the
futility of this argument, Clyde Snow next resorts to the position that even though there
was no formal properly filed intervention the parties waived any objection to the
impropriety and intervention should be allowed. The Court of Appeals properly rejected
these arguments.
The Court of Appeals compares this matter to a similar case, Ostler v. Buhler,
1999 UT 99, 989 P.2d 1073, saying that in that case,
even though the party failed to respond to a nonparty's motions for two years,
the party did not waive his right to object to the non-party's intervention); Fisher
v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, 1 19 (holding that the parties did not waive the
12

intervention requirement because one party objected to the non-party's
participation in the action and the non-party did not attempt to participate until
after judgment was entered). But, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in Ostler, in
cases where the court has recognized waiver, the parties to the action allowed ,the
nonparty to intervene not only by failing to object to the non-party's presence but
also by failing to object to the non-party's actual participation in the underlying
action. Ostler, 1999 UT 99, ,r,r7-9.
Clyde Snow was discharged by Woodson in 20 IO after declining to provide a
budget to litigate her case and firing her lead attorney (Boyle) who wanted to proceed
with depositions as she wished. Three years after discharge, and after Woodson settled
and voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit, Clyde Snow claims to have legally intervened in
the case during a ten-minute phone call arranged by the district court on July 14, 2013. In
that phone call, Clyde Snow attempted to object to the parties' settlement and dismissal of
the action. Waiver of the formal requirements of Rule 24 was not discussed and was not
agreed to by the plaintiff and defendant in the case.
The plaintiff and the defendant had already made their agreement to dismiss their
action. The action between the parties had finalized and concluded. Despite Clyde
Snow's failure to file a motion to intervene and over the objections of the parties in the
case, the district court improperly entertained Clyde Snow's objection.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the district court in this case erred in
failing to comply with the strict principles stated in Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 989
P.2d 1073:
intervention is not to be permitted after entry of judgment."'). Id. at ,r9. In Ostler,
the court concluded "as a non-party to the underlying action the attorney had to file
a motion to intervene, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
13

for the court to have jurisdiction over his claim," Id. at ,II 8. Likewise, in Neilson v.
Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court ruled that "the
statutory charging lien may not be foreclosed by way of the attorney's request for
that relief in the original action; instead, counsel must bring a separate action
against the client to determine the amount of the fee and foreclose the lien."
Clyde Snow still has a remedy available to enforce its lien after a dismissal
through a separate cause of action. Clyde Snow appears to concede this point by virtue of
the fact that they have recently filed such a cause of action in the case of Clyde Snow &

Sessions vs. Boyle, Thomas, et al., Case No.160903744. Boyle and Woodson are named
defendan~. Clyde Snow's separate cause of action is the appropriate forum for the
resolution of its claim.
The. Court of Appeals goes on to say that the Supreme Court "has noted that this
rule is consistent with its instruction that, absent "'special circumstances,"' an attorney
lien should be enforced in a separate action." Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 19 n.3, 989
P.2d 1073 (quoting Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 442 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah 1968));
see also Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 1211 n.33 (advising an attorney to file a separate suit
to recover fees).
The Court of Appeals correctly points out that, "[t]he record shows that the court's
only reason for not dismissing and closing the case was Clyde Snow's improper
objection; no other issues between the parties remained unresolved in the underlying
action when Clyde Snow objected to the parties' motion to dismiss." See Skypark Airport

Ass 'n, 2011 UT App 230, ,r,r 3-7 & n.2 (holding that the trial court did not err by denying
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a non-party's motion to intervene as untimely when the non-party filed its motion after
the verdict but before judgment was entered). Here, there was not even a motion.
Even with a motion, as the Court of Appeals explains:
,11 "[w]aiver is the only exception to the procedural requirements for intervention
under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." In addition, "[p]arties to an
action may waive the formal intervention requirements by implicitly or explicitly
allowing a non-party's consistent participation in a pending action. See Utah Ass'n
of Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895 P.2d 825,827 (Utah 1995). The Court of Appeals
notes, "Similar to Ostler, this is not a case where the parties implicitly allowed
Clyde Snow to participate in the underlying action; instead, the record shows the
parties objected to its participation. At the telephonic hearing on Clyde Snow's
objection to the parties' motion to dismiss, the defendants voiced their concerns
about the court keeping the case open to resolve the attorney lien dispute. They
stated, "It would certainly ... be a lot fairer ... to dismiss this action, to close out
this case . . . otherwise [we] are going to continue to be at least peripherally
involved in this matter." The court responded, "If I were to enter an order
dismissing all claims against your client with prejudice, however, simply leaving
open the issue of the attorney's lien, wouldn't that get you what you needed?" The
defendants replied, "Your Honor. I just think that it would be cleaner the other
way."

The record also reflects that the attorney asked to represent Prince Yeates and
Boyle in the hearing was disconnected from the call shortly after the call began. Counsel
was dropped as a participant which made the telephonic hearing inherently unfair. Mr.
Akin originally asked of Mr. Boyle: "Do you want me to talk?" To which Mr. Boyle
replied: "Go ahead, Blake." But it became clear Mr. Atkin's call had been dropped. The
district court asked: "Is Mr. Atkin on the line? Mr. Boyle?" To which Boyle replied:
"Sounds like we lost Blake." R. at 4677.
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In addition, after the district court issued its orders dismissing all claims,
effectively dismissing the parties who had voluntarily settled their disputes, and before
Clyde Snow had filed anything, Mr. Atkin made an appearance for Woodson and
objected to intervention on behalf of Woodson. "Finally, Clyde Snow has not moved to
intervene in this action nor filed a separate action. It has thus not invoked the jurisdiction
of this court to enforce the lien. Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (4)." R. at 4699.
A.fter the court's phone call, Clyde Snow misrepresents that, "[t]he parties approved
orders reflecting the district court's rulings that were thereafter entered." Appellee Br. at

10.
This clearly cannot be possible. Boyle was not a party. PYG was not a party. The
claims of Woodson and CEC had been dismissed. They were no longer parties to any
pending action. There is no legal authority given for having to respond to post-judgment
motions.
In Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, 119, 67 P.3d 1055, the Court of Appeals
approved the district court's determination that:

no waiver had occurred because the attorney's motions were post-judgment
motions that in no way affected the merits of the underlying action, its settlement,
or its subsequent dismissal. In essence, the case between the parties had ended
before [the attorney] attempted to intervene. Under such circumstances, we can see
no rea~on to require a party to respond to a non-party's post-judgment motions at
the risk of having those non-parties treated as proper interveners.
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The Court noted that the Utah Supreme Court "has explained that allowing
intervention post-judgment is disfavored because it tends to prejudice the rights of
existing parties and "can interfere with the orderly processes of the court." See Parduhn

v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22.
And that, it has.
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the district court prejudiced the rights of
Woodson and CEC in entertaining Clyde Snow's motion even after objections were
made.

121 "[T]he court's decision put the actual parties in an untenable situation." See
Oster, 1999 UT 99, 19 (explaining that a party's response to a non-party's postjudgment motions puts the party, at the risk of having those non-parties treated as
proper parties).
Despite the quagmire the district court created, the court dismissed the claims of
Woodson and CEC - claims that had already been voluntarily settled - and stated it was
retaining jurisdiction to keep a case open where the disputes between the parties had
ended, trial was cancelled, where there were no pending actions, and where the original
parties were excused from any further proceedings. In doing so, Clyde Snow was allowed
to pursue a lien as an intervener, even though a motion to intervene (which Clyde Snow
never filed) was not yet ripe according to Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 because no demand
for payment to the client had ever been made and 30 days had not passed with no
payment made before intervention in a pending action could occur. Intervention in a
pending action was not Clyde Snow's only option to enforce its lien.
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Clyde Snow complains it could not intervene according to Utah law and holds that
the Court of Appeals "created an impossible situation for Clyde Snow and all other
attorneys proceeding on a contingency fee contract." (See Brief of Appellant on Writ of
Certiorari, page 20). Clyde Snow cites a California case, Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d,14
(Cal. 1972) as to why discharged attorneys in Utah cannot perfect liens in contingency
cases. Clyde Snow is mistaken about the options available to enforce a lien under Utah
Code Ann. § 38-2-7. And the California case is distinguishable. The problem in

Fracasse, was that the discharged attorney demanded payment by suing the client while
the contingency case was still pending. The court's decisions in Fracasse protects the
absolute right of a client to discharge an attorney and protects clients from having to fight
lawsuits with discharged attorneys over fees while a contingency case is still pending.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 gives attorneys two options to intervene and enforce
liens. Clyde Snow simply does not like the second option. In order to intervene in a
pending action to enforce its lien, Clyde Snow had to make a sum certain demand for
payment in the pending action for the reasonable value of its services and then wait 30
days. After no payment was made, Clyde Snow could file a motion to intervene in the
pending action. But if Clyde Snow wanted to wait and see what the final outcome of the
Woodson recovery was - which is what Clyde Snow wanted - then after the pending
action was over, a settlement a demand for payment would be made, and after 30 days, a
separate action could be filed after the underlying lawsuit had settled, where it would be
determined, based on the entire recovery, what the attorneys fee for the reasonable value
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of its services would be. Clyde Snow wants to pick and choose which parts of each
option allowed by Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 to enforce its lien it likes.
The court in Fracasse also said: "The relation of attorney and client is one of
special confidence and trust, and the dignity and integrity of the legal profession demand
that the interests of the client be fully protected." Id.
As far as fees, Fracasse stated: "The general rule as to measure of damages [of the
discharged attorney] ... 'is not the whole price agreed to be paid, but the actual loss
sustained, which will consist of the value of the services rendered and the damage
sustained by the refusal to allow performance of the rest of the contract."'
Woodson contends the lien was invalid because Clyde Snow abandoned her case
was not willing to perform the rest of the contract, so there was little "damage" to Clyde
Snow to charge her for something Clyde Snow was not willing to do. The reasonable fee
for doing nothing is nothing. "In Grafton v. Paine, the court observed that when a law
partner is unwilling to prosecute a client's case, he is not entitled to participate in the fees
generated." See Woodson's Petition to Nullify, R. at 4693-4707, at 4694 and 4698-99.
By declining to fund her litigation, even to take a single deposition, and to fire her lead
attorney was to shift the effort and risk ofWoodson's case back to Woodson, allowing
Clyde Snow to sit on the sidelines, hedge its bets and wait for a free ride. But those
issues of Clyde Snow's lien should be properly determined in a separate action.
Clyde Snow's theory that it should not have to make a lien demand until after a
case is settled (with the theory that it would still somehow oddly be a pending action)
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where there are actual fees to claim does not jive with Clyde Snow's theory that after the
case was settled and there were actual fees to claim, the case was over and it was too late
for Woodson to dispute Clyde Snow's fees, because they were PYG's fees, and she did
not dispute fees to PYG. Clyde Snow does not say when, if ever under its theory on how
to enforce a lien, Woodson, and other clients in contingency fee cases would have a right
to dispute the fees of a discharged attorney.
It is undisputed that Clyde Snow's fees are governed by the contract with Woodson. And
that contract states that upon termination of the agreement, "the Firm shall be
compensated for the reasonable value of the Firm's services." R. at 5313-5317. The
contract does not allow Clyde Snow to be paid for the value of PYG's services or time in
the case. Ambiguities in a fee agreement are construed in favor of a client." Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996).

That Clyde Snow even objected to Woodson' s settlement agreement with CEC is
fraught with fiduciary and ethical problems. In addition, Clyde Snow had no claim
involving the subject matter of that agreement with CEC to settled claims involving the
wrongful death ofWoodson's son, Caleb Jensen. Clyde Snow was simply not a party, and
at the point it attempted to intervene in the case, did not belong.

It was the Court of Appeals that clearly recognized in reviewing jurisdiction that
Clyde Snow, PYG, and Boyle were not parties to the underlying action. The true parties
had no further pending actions or disputes for Clyde Snow to participate in. The true
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parties had their claims dismissed. The record clearly shows Woodson and CEC were not
included in, or part of, any further proceedings, except when Woodson filed a petition
objecting to Clyde Snow's participation, stating that Clyde Snow had not properly
intervened. R. at 4693-4707, at 4694 and 4698-99. Woodson was not asked to file
motions or briefs or attend hearings, nor was she included or given notice or certificate of
service on motions or orders or hearings. Yet Clyde Snow's lien stemmed from its
contractual agreement with Woodson, not Prince Yeates, and not Boyle. Woodson' s right
to dispute Clyde Snow's fees - a right she was given in her contingency fee contractwas prejudiced and her legal standing to challenge the lien was circumvented through the
district court's error. Essentially, Clyde Snow made its demand for payment of its fees to
the district court rather than to the client and the district court allowed this impropriety to
go forward.
Finally, even if Woodson and CEC had agreed to a situation where the underlying
action was dismissed, the claims were dismissed, the parties were dismissed, and Clyde
Snow was somehow allowed to proceed anyway, there was no subject matter jurisdiction
for such an action. As the Court of Appeals said in its opinion: "Subject matter
jurisdiction is not a matter of the court's discretion." See Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d
1172, 1173-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1~91).
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that there was no waiver to the
formal requirements of intervention, and the district court was without jurisdiction to
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grant intervention to Clyde Snow when the law firm failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of the Rule.

II.

THE INTERPLEADER
The second issue on certiorari asks:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Petitioners arguments regarding its
status as an "interpleader party" were inadequately briefed and did not demonstrate such a
status.
The Court of Appeals states:
[T]hese characterizations of the funds deposited with the court as an interpleader'
action are inaccurate. Although we acknowledge that Prince Yeates filed a motion,
titled 'Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler's Motion to Interplead Funds,' this did not
establish an interpleader action. Proper interpleader actions are asserted in a
complaint or, by way of a cross-claim or counterclaim.' See Utah R. Civ. P. 22
(Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be
exposed to double or multiple liability .... A defendant exposed to similar liability
may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim.'). Although
an interpleader action is not limited to an original action, rule 22 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure requires filing a pleading. Prince Yeates did not file a
complaint, nor a cross-claim or counterclaim. Thus, what Prince Yeates filed was
not in fact an interpleader action. Further, Clyde Snow offers no legal authority to
support the proposition that a non-party may achieve party status by filing a
motion to interplead funds." See Opinion at to Footnote 4 to 123.

Clyde Snow is surprised the Court of Appeals regulated the interpleader to not
much more than a footnote in its opinion. But if the post-judgment orders of the district
court were void, then the interpleader is void. The interpleader proceedings in the
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Woodson case cannot legitimize non-intervention anymore that a grant of certiorari.
While the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree does not apply in civil cases, See Utah v.

Strieff, the general analogy applies. With a void judgment being the foundation for
everything that came after, the interpleader was a dead limb.
The Court of Appeals was correct that the interpleader did not have a proper
pleading according to Rule 22, and was not a complaint, and was not an interpleader
action. PYG stated the authority of the interpleader was pursuant to Rule 22, which it did
not follQw, and also said it was pursuant to the July 2013 orders of the district court, R. at
6325. But those orders were void. The Court of Appeals is correct that the interpleader
was not an interpleader with proper authority.
The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that it was "improper for the trial court
to grant a request to enforce an attorney lien, if the attorney is not a party to the
underlying case. Therefore, the court's orders stemming from Clyde Snow's motions are
void, including its decision to keep the case open based on Clyde Snow's objection and
its orders based on Prince Yeates's interpleader motion." See Opinion at 124.
Trial courts lack jurisdiction until proper pleadings are filed. Lovett v. Lovett, 112
So. 768, 776 (Fla. 1927). The district court had no jurisdiction over Prince Yeates, Clyde
Snow, or Boyle.
Clyde Snow says it ''was not required to file a motion to intervene because Clyde
Snow and Boyle had been ordered to participate in the interpleader, to which they agreed,
thereby rendering the obligation moot, waived, or satisfied." Appellee Br. at 26.
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"Moreover, any requirement to intervene was waived, or rendered moot by the
establishment of an interpleader." Appellee Br. at 22. Even if Clyde Snow had
intervened, PYG and Boyle had not. They were not parties to the underlying action. The
interpleader, as part of the Woodson case, did not have jurisdiction over PYG and Boyle.
Boyle could not waive jurisdiction and become a party in the Woodson case anymore
than Clyde Snow or PYG could. Subject matter cannot be presumed.
The Court of Appeals was correct in its opinion from looking at the record that
Clyde Snow, Boyle, and PYG were not parties to the Woodson case, so how they could
agree to become parties to the Woodson case in order to participate in an interpleader has
no legal authority. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in New York Life v.
Dunlevy 241 U.S. 518, that for a claimant to be bound by an interpleader that the court

must have personal jurisdiction over the claimants. There was no personal jurisdiction.
As the court in Sache v. Wallace, 112 N.W. 386, 387 (Minn. 1907), stated: "[a] court's
power to decide and determine matters in disputes between the parties in a given action is
limited to those questions which are brought before it by the pleadings. Rule 22 dealing
with interpleader is not ambiguous.
In the interpleader, there was no subject matter jurisdiction because there was no proper
pleading, there was no personal jurisdiction over Woodson at point, since she was no
longer part of the proceedings, having her claims dismissed. Even if Clyde Snow had
intervened, there was no jurisdiction over PYG or Boyle. Although certificates of
service were included with motions, a summons was not made pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
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P. 4, and no $360.00 civil fee for invoking the jurisdiction of the court for an interpleader
under 78A-2-301 (1) (a) (iii) was paid.
After Clyde Snow called itself an intervenor in the Woodson case for the first time
R. at 5444, Boyle responded, and objected with a motion to dismiss and to strike
intervention. R. at 5467-5474. At a June 10, 2014 hearing, the district court ruled Boyle
had waited too long to challenge intervention. R. at 6524, at 28, line 3. However,
"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may be questioned at any point. The right to make such an
objection is never waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567,570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The district court's written June 23, 2014 Order, which denied Boyle's motion to
strike and motion to dismiss states: "The Court concludes that Clyde Snow is a proper
interpleader party." The order goes on to say: "any issue or other procedural objection
associated with the requirement to present a formal motion to intervene has been resolved
by prior orders of the Court, and the establishment of the interpleader."
The order acknowledges there were objections to Clyde Snow's intervention
during the interpleader process, and does not state that waiver of the parties was the
reasoning behind the prior orders. Rather, the district court states in its order that Clyde
Snow's requirement to present a formal motion to intervene was simply resolved "by
prior orders of the Court, and the establishment of the interpleader."
At the June I 0, 2013 hearing, the district court called Clyde Snow a proper
interpleader party. Boyle asked the court ifhe was a proper interpleader party, and the
court declined to say that he was. (See the hearing transcript, R. at 6524).
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As the Court of Appeals said in its Opinion on page 12, footnote 4 that: "The
district court denied Boyle's motion to dismiss, concluding that Clyde Snow was a proper
interpleader party.' And, on appeal, Clyde Snow asserts that when the district court
approved the establishment of an interpleader proceeding within the action ... [the court]
identified Clyde Snow and Boyle as parties to that proceeding.'
However, there is nothing in the record that the district court gave Boyle the same
status as Clyde Snow, in considering he was "a proper interpleader party," including
when the interpleader was established with the district court's order on March 17, 2014 in
the "Order Granting Motion to Interplead Funds." PYG named Boyle as a claimant in its
motion but the court, R. at 5073-5086. The district court granted the interpleader and
releasing PYG from liability to Boyle and Clyde Snow, did not name them as claimants.
R. at 5275-5280, and indicated throughout the remainder of the proceedings that only the
Clyde Snow and PYG could be claimants to seek the funds held by the court. PYG's
assignment of rights to Boyle was not recognized by the court. "The issue as to the
claimed assignment of the recovery to Boyle is reserved by the Court." (R. at 6323), page
2, 07I16/2014 Order, Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw.
If Boyle was not a party, and not a claimant with the right to be heard under those
claims, and his assignment from PYG was m~aningless, and even his assignment from
Woodson was not considered, was PYG, as the supposed plaintiff, also a claimant? And
if not, who was the other claimant in the interpleader? During the Evidentiary Hearing on
July 2, 2014, Boyle said to the district court:
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If the Court says my assignment from Prince Yeates is no good, then the
interpleader did not protect Prince Yeates as it intended to do, and it would result,
in my opinion, in an unconscionable result. The interpleader process establishes a
stakeholder to turn a controversy over to the courts, but the Court is now
considering kicking the ball back to PYG saying it's a PYG controversy, and if
that's the case, then again the stakeholder has created a controversy and
interpleader would be improper. (R. at 6525, page 132, lines 6-12, and 25, page
133, lines 1-5, lines 20-25, page 134, lines 1-3. 7/2/2014 Evidentiary Hearing
Transcript.
As in the underlying action, Clyde Snow appears to be the only participant in the
interpleader proceeding protected by the interpleader. In the Evidentiary Hearing on July
2, 2014, the district told Boyle at the onset of the hearing: "I'm not here to adjudicate any
claims that you [Boyle] have against Clyde Snow," (R. at 6425), Page 4, Line 8-10,
7/2/2014 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript. If the district court was not there to adjudicate
any claims Boyle had, Boyle was not a claimant. His lack of status as a claimant was
further clarified by the district court in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law: "[A]ny claim [Boyle] may have against Clyde Snow or PYG is not before this
Court." (R. at 6332).

If Boyle was not a claimant in the so-called interpleader, who was the other
claimant? That flaw alone is fatal and should make the interpleader improper on its face,
and certainly means it was not adequately briefed.

In addition, and crucial to the question of whether the interpleader was adequately
briefed, Woodson, according to Clyde Snow's lien, was the named as the "owner of the
property." R. at 4925-4929, page 2B. Yet she was not even named by PYG as a possible
claimant to the funds in its interpleader motion. She had not disclaimed interest in the
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funds. She never released them to PYG or to the court. In fact, in her petition, she
disputed the lien, and disputed that if she did owe anything to Clyde Snow, it should not
be more than $:XXXXX,3 (R. at 4702), which would have been the fee Clyde Snow would
have received based on what Clyde Snow management valued the case at. On the record,
she put everyone on notice that she might have a claim to any funds PYG disclaimed. "If
Clyde Snow didn't think Caleb's death was worth very much and didn't think my case
was very good, then they shouldn't be trying to get so much money for it now." (R. at
6073). See 6/19/2014 Declaration ofDawn Woodson. She disputed the lien, and she
disputed the fees. Yet she was completely left out of the proceedings.
When the district court released PYG from liability, the court released PYG from
liability to Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Matthew Wiese. The court did not release PYG from
liability to Dawn Woodson. She disputed the lien and she disputed Clyde Snow's fees in
her petition. R. at 4702. Her rights were prejudiced. She had a claim to the funds and
was not named as a claimant. The interpleader was not adequately briefed. It deprived
Woodson of her rights, her property, and it was improper according to Rule 22, the Utah
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.
,

Without Woodson, and without any other parties, there was no one for Clyde
Snow to enforce its lien against. Boyle, as an assignee of PYG could have been a proper
claimant, but PYG, as the stakeholder who gave an assignment to Boyle could not be a

Because the settlement in the Woodson case was confidential, Respondent has redacted
any dollar amounts referring in any way to the settlement fees.
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3

stakeholder and a claimant, as the district court suggested. Said the district court: "The
uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that allocating the fees between firms on the basis
of the comparative hours worked by each firm is an appropriate methodology to be
applied in this contingency case. R. at 6313, page 5, Trial Court's 7/16/2014 Findings of
Fact and Conclusions ofLaw.
The court had no jurisdiction over Woodson after she voluntarily dismissed her
claims with CEC. During the interpleader, the court never claimed to have jurisdiction of
her. Yet the court also did not have jurisdiction of PYO or Boyle, because they were not
parties to the Woodson case. And even if the court did have jurisdiction of Boyle, the
lien had to be enforced against Woodson, because she was the one Clyde Snow had a
contingency fee agreement with, R. at 5316-5317. There was no contract or fee-sharing
agreement between Clyde Snow and PYO.
PYO was not a party to the underlying action. Boyle was not a party to the
underlying lawsuit and Woodson was not a party to the interpleader. As a result, neither
could be a part of the interpleader. There was no jurisdiction over either of them, and
there was no one for Clyde Snow to enforce a lien against in an interpleader against.
Clyde Snow claims in its brief that if PYO had initiated an actual lawsuit and named itself
as a plaintiff, the problems would have "evaporated." (See Brief of Appellant On Writ of
Certiorari, page 33). But PYO did not initiate a lawsuit. And even if PYO had properly
followed Rule 22, the problems would not have "evaporated." Not filing a proper
pleading according to Rule 22 disqualified the PYO's motion as a pleading, but the
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problems went beyond that.
The interpleader was improper and could not be adequately briefed by Clyde Snow
and addressed by the court because of other flaws. Woodson was excluded as a potential
claimant, even though she disputed the lien and the fees in the telephonic hearing, in her
petition to nullify lien, and in her affidavit. PYO, as a stakeholder, did not have control
of the funds. The court ordered the funds into trust until further order of the court in its
July 31, 2013 orders. R. at 4689. The court had control of the funds, and the court could
not have been the stakeholder. Boyle had a possible claim against PYO for breach of the
employment contract that went beyond a claim to the funds that the district court had no
jurisdiction over.
Either Boyle was a party to the interpleader or he was not. If he was a nonparty to
the underlying action, but became a party without intervention through the interpleader
and there was a fmal, appealable order, then the Court of Appeals should have given him
appeal of right. But if he was a nonparty to the underlying action as the Court
determined, and did not become a party through the interpleader, which was not a
separate action, then he correctly had no appeal of right. Clyde Snow has shown no legal
authority for how it was the only proper interpleader party, with a stakeholder that was
also considered a claimant, that had given up its interest, as part of an underlying action,
without intervention, leading to a fmal order by the district court, disbursing funds from
the settlement of the owner of the property, but who was not involved in the proceeding.
This was not form over substance as Clyde Snow claims (See Brief of Appellant
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on Writ of Certiorari, page 32). This was just nonsense over form.
The interpleader, which stated its authority came from the July 2013 court orders
and Rule 22, sidestepped Rule 22 (interpleaders), Rule 3 (civil action commencement),
and Rule 4 (summons), Rule 24 (intervention), Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (enforcing an
attorneys lien). It also sidestepped the contingency fee agreement between Woodson and
Clyde Snow that governed Clyde Snow's fees, and cut out the client out in an attempt to
enforce a lien without having to involve the client and comply with Utah law. The
"form" of those laws Clyde Snow dislikes so much protects a client's rights as well as the
rights of attorneys. And then there are all the due process issues that come with there
being only one party in a proceeding, a nonparty at that, being given property that the
nonparty states on the record belongs to someone else. 4
"A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of
law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has
the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction." Wuest v.

Wuest, 127 P2d 934,937.
If Woodson was still aparty during the interpleader proceedings, her rights were
prejudiced by the district court. If she was not still a party in her case, then Clyde Snow
was the only party in both the underlying action and in the interpleader. But Woodson

See Clyde Snow's Second Restated Lien, page 2 B. "The name of the client who is the
owner of the property subject to this attorneys' lien (Utah Code Ann. 38-2-7 (5Xb)_:
Dawn Woodson, individually ...." Rat 4925.
4
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was not a part of the interpleader, because PYG, Clyde Snow, and the district court did
not name her as a claimant.
Woodson' s claims were not briefed at all. Her potential right to be a claimant was
not even considered, yet Clyde Snow named her in its lien as the owner of the property in
question. R. at 4925-4929.
Clyde Snow states: "matters were fully briefed and addressed by the court without
[any party asserting] that the court lacked jurisdiction." But Boyle (who was not a party)
did not consent to the interpleader R. at 5211 or agree with jurisdiction in the matter.
And, as a nonparty, he was unable to assert anything.
Clyde Snow stated the trial court was vested with jurisdiction over the
interpleader, R. at 544 7. Boyle did not agree the court had jurisdiction in the interpleader,
R. at 5518. Ifhe was truly a party and a claimant to an interpleader, he challenges the
jurisdiction of it now. "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time" and "jurisdiction, once
challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
495 F 2d 906, 910. Woodson also challenged jurisdiction of the district court in the
petition to nullify.
Clyde Snow filed a complaint to foreclose its lien in the interpleader proceeding
and declared itself an "intervener," R. at 5446. There was a certificate of service from
Clyde Snow to Boyle. Although Boyle was a nonparty to the underlying action, he filed a
Motion to Dismiss and Strike Intervention. R. at 5467-5474. The motion was denied.
As the Court of Appeals recognized in its Opinion, the district court said Boyle took too
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long to object, 110. The court presented no legal authority that Boyle, as a nonparty, had
taken too long to object in the "interpleader." And since the interpleader, as Clyde Snow
claims, was some sort of new event that triggered a clean slate where intervention was no
longer necessary, the timeliness of Boyle's objection should have not been a question.
Clyde Snow claims Boyle agreed with the court that his objection was untimely. In the
hearing, he only acknowledged and was perplexed that based on the July 2013 orders, the
district court was the playing by a set of rules that did not make sense to him. 5
Clyde Snow asserts that the funds ''were deposited by Ms. Woodson's counsel in
the underlying case (PYG). R. 5284-88." But PYG was not representing Woodson at this
time and never claimed to still be her counsel. The last Notice of Appearance for
Woodson, filed on August 9, 2013, was filed by Blake Atkin on August 9, not PYG.
Furthermore, even if the interpleader had been an actual interpleader, and PYG
was her counsel, PYG neglected to consider or name Woodson as a potential claimant of
. the funds it held in trust. Woodson put PYG on notice in her Petition to Nullify Lien that
it would be unconscionable for Clyde Snow to receive more than $XXXXX in fees. R. at
4702. If PYG had no interest in the funds, Woodson potentially did. She never
disclaimed interest, she was never asked if she disclaimed interest, and from her Petition,
she made it clear that anything paid to Clyde Snow over $XXXXX she disputed. PYG
still had a fiduciary duty to her, but ignored her. Clyde Snow had a fiduciary duty to her,

5

See the transcript of the June 10, 2014 hearing at R. 6524.
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and ignored her. The district court effectively dismissed her from the underlying case,
and ignored her objections in her Petition and in her sworn declaration related to Clyde
Snow's lien. Yet it was her contract with Clyde Snow that governed Clyde Snow's fees,
not the district court, and not an improper interpleader. And that contract gave her the
right to Clyde Snow's dispute fees, and the proceedings ordered by the district court
prejudiced her right to do so.
A California court in Mojtahedi v. Vargas (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 974,976,
required that the former client must be named as a party to the separate, independent
action to establish the existence and validity of an attorney fee lien. The Mojtahedi court
concluded that without bringing a separate action against the clients, a former attorney
cannot establish -the existence, amount, and enforceability of his lien on settlement
funds. (Id. at p. 979.) The court's reasoning focused on the significance of the plaintiff's
choice not to name his former clients as a party. The court noted that the plaintiff's time
log would be-useful to adjudicate the reasonable value of plaintiff's services in a
separate action against the clients, but it was insufficient to state a claim against the
successor attorney. (Id. at p. 978.) It went on to emphasize -the attorney's lien is only
enforceable after the attorney adjudicates the value and validity of the lien in a separate
action against his client.
Unlike other liens, "an attorney's lien is not created by the mere fact that an
attorney has performed services in a case." Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1168, 1172.
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It is well established that "[a]fter the client obtains a judgment, the attorney must
bring a separate, independent action against the client to establish the existence of the
lien, to determine the amount of the lien, and to enforce it."' Brown v. Superior Court
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 320, 328. Therefore, he has yet to establish the value or validity
of his purported lien.
Clyde Snow's contract for fees was with Woodson, not with PYG or Boyle.
Prince Yeates was not a party. Clyde Snow was not a party. Boyle was not a party. The
Court of Appeals got it right. The underlying case was over. The interpleader was not an
interpleader as PYG did not file a complaint and was not a plaintiff. It did not include
Woodson as a possible claimant of the settlement fees, even though she was the owner of
the settlement.
Clyde Snow wants the Supreme Court to remove the client from the process of
enforcing a lien. Clyde Snow and the court eliminated the client from the proceeding.
Her right to due process in the lien process was violated.
Clyde Snow states "[a] claim to enforce an attorney's lien invokes the district
court's equitable jurisdiction." Appellee Br. at 2. And "[a]n interpleader is established
and administered pursuant to a district court's equitable jurisdiction." But there was no
jurisdiction.
Clyde Snow claims Boyle was "individually a party to the interpleader
proceeding." Appellee Br. at 30. While Boyle disputes the district court considered him a
proper claimant, Clyde Snow does not state how he became a party. Clyde Snow claims
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Boyle "failed to present evidence in support of a claim or right by which he could
personally recover attorney's fees from the interpleader res." Appellee Br. at 18. It was
the assignment of rights from PYG that allowed Boyle to receive fees as PYG's assignee
who stood in PYG's shoes. "The common law puts the assignee in the assignor's shoes."
Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB & G Eng'g, Inc., 2010 UT 6,, 13,230 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2010).
It is well recognized that "[t]he assignee [stands] in the shoes of the assignor." John E.
Murray, Jr., Corbin on Contracts§ 51.1 (rev. ed.2007).
"The purpose of the interpleader statute was to give the stakeholder protection, but
in nowise to change the rights of the claimants by its operation." Lee v. West Coast Life

Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, ,10 (9th Cir. 2012). Clyde Snow provides no legal support for
the destruction of Boyle's assigned rights via filing of the interpleader. Clyde Snow only
states the assignment was ofno consequence because PYG "disclaimed any interest in or
right to the interpleaded funds." Appellee Br. at 27.
Clyde Snow claims ''the district court did not disregard Boyle's claimed
assignment from PYG." Appellee Br. at 27. But the court declined to hear from Boyle as
PYG's assignee. The district court stated in its findings that the court had to give Clyde
Snow a portion of PYG's fees because ''the Court notes that PYG has acquiesced in that
division of fees." R. at 6330. Clyde Snow and the district court do not explain why the
assignment of rights did not matter, and even if it did not matter, the court never
considered giving the fees that "PYG acquiesced" back to Woodson.
Clyde Snow states ''the district court ruled that the evidentiary hearing with regard
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to the interpleader res and Clyde Snow's lien would be limited to the resolution of claims
associated with the ability to recover attorney's fees." Appellee Br. at 16.
The court limited the interpleader and refused to hear Boyle's claims, or consider what
claims Dawn might have, and then found "[Boyle] has presented no facts that would
indicate that the amount of Clyde Snow's claimed lien is unfair or unreasonable." R. at
6330-6331.
The district court, at the outset of the evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2014, refused
to hear Boyle's claims. R. at 6332 and Rat 6525, p. 4. The court declined to hear any
claims Boyle had against Clyde Snow. R. at 6330. The court also declined to allow
Woodson's rights to be part of the evidentiary hearing. R. at 6525, p. 4. Clyde Snow
contends Woodson had no more rights under contingency fee agreement with Clyde
Snow, and only Clyde Snow had rights, stating she "paid a single contingent fee to PYG,
apparently willingly, in accordance with her contingent fee agreement with that firm."
Although Woodson objected to the validity of Clyde Snow's lien and to Clyde Snow
receiving more than $XXXXX, Clyde Snow claims ''t]here is no record of her objecting
in any way to the total amount of the fee earned by the two law firms and collected by
PYG, and thus no basis for a claim that her interests were prejudiced." Appellee Br. at
31. Clyde Snow wants to piggy-back onto PYG's contract with Woodson. But PYG and
Clyde Snow did not have any kind of contract or shared fee agreement.
Clyde Snow fails to acknowledge Woodson had rights through her contingency fee
agreement with Clyde Snow, separate from contingency fee agreement with PYG. R. at
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5714-5718. Clyde Snow contends Woodson contract with PYG eliminated her rights
under her contract with Clyde Snow to dispute fees. Yet Clyde Snow relied on the
contingency fee agreement with Woodson for its lien. But her rights in the agreement
and the protections afforded to her through Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7and Rule 24 were
ignored. Clyde Snow named Dawn Woodson as the owner of the property subject to its
lien when filing its restated and amended lien in January of 2014 in its Second Restated
Lien.
But in the interpleader, there was no service or summons on Woodson, there was
no delivery of a complaint to her or warning that if she did not respond she would be in
default judgment. In its restated lien, Clyde Snow named Woodson as "the client who is
the owner of the property subject to this attorney's lien" (Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (5)
(b). (page 2, January 2014). As the owner of the property, and as a potential claimant to
the fees held by PYG, Woodson should have been named as a claimant by PYG in the
supposed interpleader and her disinterest and rights determined. It was not adequately
briefed.
Clyde Snow also provides no legal authority for why the mere filing of the
interpleader extinguished Boyle's rights or claim regarding his assignment of rights from
both PYG and Woodson. She had the rights under her contingency fee agreement. But
Clyde Snow's fees were assumed by the court to be valid and undisputed before a
demand was ever made. The court took jurisdiction and allowed Clyde Snow to
improperly use the cloak of an interpleader proceeding within a dismissed lawsuit to
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intervene, become a party, and remove the real party- Woodson - from the proceeding
and enforce its lien against her. Woodson was denied due process in this process.

If Clyde Snow can show there was a proper plaintiff and an opposing defendants
in the interpleader, procedural due process requires that the defendants receive adequate
notice of the pending action and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that affected
his or her interests. In the interpleader action, the court determined Boyle had no
standing to have his claims heard and that his contractual assignment of rights from PYG
had no merit, distinguishing rights he had before the proceeding. If Woodson was the
opposing party and defendant, she was never named as such, she was never given notice
of the interpleader or the foreclosure of Clyde Snow's lien and was also not given an
opportunity to be heard in the proceeding.
If a client disputes a lien, which happened in the telephonic hearing, and disputes
the fees, which happened in the petition, a separate action is needed or the arbitration
clause of the contingency fee contract would have to be the means to resolve the dispute,
rather than a summary proceeding where the client who disputed the lien and the fees was
not involved.
The Court of Appeals is correct in its analysis. Boyle did not receive a summons
under Rule 4. He had not intervened in the underlying action. He did not have an appeal
of right. PYG, Clyde Snow, and Boyle were all nonparties in the underlying action. And
while Boyle was named as a claimant in the interpleader by PYG, PYG, who was also a
nonparty, could not decide on its own that Boyle and Clyde Snow were "parties." And
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Woodson, who should have been named as a claimant in any kind of proper interpleader
action, was left out altogether.
"Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of
law, court is deprived of juris." Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739. The court
denied Woodson due process given to her in her CFA with Clyde Snow, in Utah Code
Ann.§ 38-2-7, the Utah Constitution, and in the U.S. Constitution.
The interpleader was a final and conclusive adjudication of not only Woodson's
rights, but to Boyle's rights, who the Court of Appeals correctly ruled along with PYG
and Clyde Snow was a nonparty. The interpleader was improper and was not adequately
briefed regarding critical and controlling issues that were not addressed by the district
court.
"No one's rights are intended to be altered by paying the fund into the court."
Vogel v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.) 55 F.(2d) 205.
"The purpose of the interpleader statute was to give the stakeholder protection, but
in nowise to change the rights of the claimants by its operation.... We think Congress
had no intention to permit ... destruction of acquired rights [under state law], if indeed it
had power so to do. Lee v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012).
"Interpleader is a procedural device not intended to alter substantive rights." Id.
Clyde Snow wants this Court to waive the requirements for following Utah Code
Ann.§ 38-2-7, Rule 24, and Rule 22 in enforcing an attorney's lien after discharge. Utah
law protecting an attorney's right to enforce a lien, is also intended to protect the rights of
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clients.
An interpleader that was not a complaint, but rather was part of an underlying
action with no parties, could not be adequately briefed where there was no plaintiff, no
defendants, and the potential claims of both Woodson and Boyle were not considered,
yet a final order was issued, denying due process.

III. JURISDICTION

The third issue on certiorari asks:

If Petitioner did not acquire party status, whether this Court can acquire
jurisdiction via a petition for writ of certiorari to reverse or vacate a Court of
Appeals decision that purported to declare a district courts judgment void
notwithstanding its concession of a lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The Utah Constitution addresses jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Article VIII,
Section 3:

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised
as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the
exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any
cause.
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A jurisdictional challenge to certiorari in this matter is appropriate due to
jurisdiction being raised in the district court, in the Court of Appeals, and, finally, now
before this Court. "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time~ And jurisdiction, once
challenged, cannot be assumed, and must be decided." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
495 F2d 906, 910. After that, once challenged, "[t]he burden shifts to the court to prove
jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F2d 416.
Appellate courts support the legitimacy of the justice system by serving as a
mechanism of review. Trial courts make mistakes. Otherwise there wouldn't be
appellate courts. See Zindler v. Buchanon, 61 A.2d 616, 618 (Mun. Ct. D.C. 1948).
The framework of the federal courts, which Utah has used as an example, are such
that "every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its
own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review." United States
v. LaBella, 15 M.J. 52. (C.A.A.F. 2015).

The concept behind ''jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction" is that a court
necessarily needs some power to decide whether it has jurisdiction or not. See Kevin M
Clermont, Principles of Civil Procedure§§ 4.4, 5.1 (2d ed. 2009).

The Court of Appeals, as the one charged with reviewing the district court's ruling,
has the authority to review whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear the merits of an
argument, or if there was jurisdiction of the lower court, otherwise, "a court without
jurisdiction does not even have the right to be right."). Dane, Perry,
"Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 23: Iss.
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1, Article, ( 1994).
As stated in the Utah Supreme Court case Garver v. Rosenberg:
24. It is true that an appellate court is the ultimate judge of its own jurisdiction. See
Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, ,r 9, 179 P.3d 799.

In the federal courts, "[c]ongress has provided that only a "party" in the court of
appeals may petition for a writ of certiorari." 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). Section 1254(1) reflects
the ''well settled" rule that "only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become
parties, may appeal an adverse judgment." Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988).
The "party" requirement ensures that the entity seeking review has already demonstrated,
in the proceedings below, that it satisfies the constitutional, statutory, and prudential
requirements for participating in the lawsuit.
Like the federal courts, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state petition for
writ of certiorari in Utah requires that "[t]he petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain,
in the order indicated: (a)( I) a list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Supreme
Court contains the names of all parties." (See Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Title
VII, Rule 49, (a), (a)(l).)
The Court of Appeals opinion stated in this matter that "because neither Clyde
Snow nor Boyle were parties to the underlying action, they are not entitled to an appeal of

right." See Utah Down Syndrome Found., 2012 UT 86 ,r 9. The Court of Appeals ruled
there were no parties to the proceedings it reviewed. In the underlying district court case,
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there was a void judgment, voiding the proceedings in the underlying case as if they had
not happened. As a result, there was no proceeding that Clyde Snow's nonparty status
provides a jurisdictional basis for that allows this Court a writ of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals correctly statedthat118 Under similar circumstances, in

Ostler v. Buhler, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial court's order to distribute
settlement funds directly to an attorney was void because the attorney failed to properly
intervene prior to judgment. Id. 19.
119 On appeal, the attorney argued that the employee's failure to object to his
motion for two years constituted waiver. Id. 1 6. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed,
clarifying that this was not a case in which the employee or the former employer, the
parties to the action, allowed the attorney to participate. Id. ,Ml 7-9.
Rather, the court explained, the case between the parties had ended before [the
attorney] attempted to intervene. 19. It stated that ,the attorney's motions were postjudgment motions that in no way affected the merits of the underlying action, its
settlement, or its dismissal.' Id. Accordingly, the court held ,that the employee's failure to
respond to the attorney's post-judgment motions did not constitute a waiver of his right to
object to the trial court's attorney fees order,' and that because ,the attorney was not a
party, ... the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order distribution of settlement proceeds to
him.• Id. 120 Here, Clyde Snow did not engage in any of the underlying action or
proceedings on its own behalf and, except for its interest in being paid for its work in
representing Woodson, it had no stake in the subject matter. See Interstate Land Corp. v.
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Patterson, 791 P .2d 110 I, 1107-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (requiring the interest of a party
seeking to intervene as a matter of right to be ,a direct claim upon the subject matter of
the action such that the applicant will either gain or lose by direct operation of the
judgment to be rendered').
The Court of Appeals is correct that Clyde Snow did not intervene, and that Boyle,
as a nonparty, had no appeal of right, and the Court could not review the merits of their
arguments. If the Supreme Court, after its review, agrees Boyle and Clyde Snow were
not parties to that proceeding, and everything that came before is void, then it appears
there were "no parties to the proceeding" as defined by the plain language of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and there is no Supreme Court jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals followed the parameters in Utah Down Syndrome and did
not allow a non-party an appeal of right and did not rule on the merits of the arguments of
Boyle or Clyde Snow.

Rather, on an inspection of the record while determining its jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction of the district court, which is the duty of the appellate court, the Court of
Appeals found ''the [district] court lacked jurisdiction to make orders with regard to their
post-judgment motions.
The Court of Appeals said it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits o(the parties.
It did not say it was devoid of any inherent power or authority.
A Texas appellate court ruled: "If the judgment is void because the trial court
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lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we must declare the judgment void and dismiss the
appeal because an appellate court has no jurisdiction to decide the merits of an appeal
from a void judgment or order. See Mellon Serv. Co. v. Touche Ross Co., 946 S.W.2d
862, 864, 870 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). If that is true, then the
appellate court in this matter could have dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on
the basis that the district court's post-judgment orders were void, as well as because
nonparties did not have an appeal of right to have the merits of their arguments heard. But
the judgment in the lower court would still be void.

While lacking jurisdiction to decide the merits of the arguments of the nonparties,
the Court had authority, and the duty, to inspect the record and in doing so, recognize a
void judgment. Jurisdiction of a court is not completely synonymous with authority of
court. And in this matter, the Court of Appeals, while lacking jurisdiction on the
arguments of the merits, had the authority and duty to declare a void judgment void.

In Valenta v. Regents of University ofCalifornia (1991), the court states: [i]t is
axiomatic that a judgment entered by a court which lacked jurisdiction is void and must
be reversed.

The Court of Appeals, in reviewing jurisdiction, did not act to make voidable the
district court's orders. Those orders were void on their face. "Such a judgment has often
been referred to as 'a dead limb upon the judicial tree." Moore v. Connecticut General
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Life Ins. Co., 71 S.D. 512, 26 N.W.2d 691,693.
There is well-settled law on this issue from courts around the country regarding the
authority of a court to lop off the dead limb of a void judgment:

Elliotv. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328,340, 26 U.S. 328,340 (1828): "Under Federal law which
is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without
authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable,
but simply void."

A voidable order is an order that must be declared void by a judge to be void; a
void order does not have to be declared void by a judge to be void. Only an
inspection of the record of the case showing that the judge was without jurisdiction
or violated a person's due process rights, or where fraud was involved in the
attempted procurement of jurisdiction, is sufficient for an order to be void. Potenz
Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill. App. 3d 617,525 N.E. 2d 173, 175 (1988).

A court may set aside at any time a judgment or order void on its face." Thorson v.
Western Development Corp. (Civ. No. 8052. Fourth Dist., Div. Two. May 19,
1967.)
The authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from Civ.R. 60(B) but
rather constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts." Patton v.
Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68.

Courts also possess inherent power to set aside void judgments. (Rogers v.
Silverman (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 1114, 1121 [265 Cal. Rptr. 286].

Courts also have inherent power to set aside a void judgment. Reid v. Baiter
(1993) 1 4 Cal.App.4th 1 1 86, 1 I 94).

Judgments entered where courts lack either subject matter jurisdiction, or that were
otherwise entered in violation of due process oflaw, must be set aside. Jaffee v.
Van Brunt, 158 F.R.D. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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A void judgment is an absolute nullity that "may be attacked in any court, by any
person, at any time. James v. lntown Ventures, LLC, 290 Ga. 813, 816(2) n. 5, 725
S.E.2d 213 (2012).

In Utah courts have rule: If judgment be void, it is open to collateral attack.
Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 (1967).
A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. Bennettv. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514 [55 P. 390].)
A "void" judgment. .. grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken
thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack. No statute of
limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby
are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and
rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound
and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had
never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court ofMichigan, 92 N.W.2d 604,354
Mich. 97 (10/13/58).
Everything that came from the void judgments of the district court, is dead and
worthless. The Court of Appeals did not kill any judgments in the district court. As part
of its review of jurisdiction, it simply stated the obvious about that which was already
dead.
The Court of Appeals accurately stated in its Opinion on page 13, footnote 4, that
Clyde Snow offered "no legal authority to support the proposition that a non-party may
achieve party status by filing a motion to interplead funds." There is continues to be no
legal authority for Clyde Snow's attempt to achieve party status via on a writ for
certiorari.
Before this Supreme Court can act, it must determine if it has jurisdiction over
48

nonparties to a void judgment in a certiorari. The answer appears to be no. There is no

iurisdiction for how a nonparty can become a party to a void iudgment. Clyde
Snow's concession of its nonparty status has led to the law firm's decision to attempt to
enforce its lien through filing a separate action as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7
as Clyde Snow & Sessions vs. Boyle, Thomas, et al, case number in the 3rd district court.
T'60903744. Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Woodson are is a parties in that action and the
district court has original jurisdiction over the matter.

The Supreme Court, in its review of jurisdiction, must not do anything that gives
effect to a district court's void judgment, giving rights where there were no rights, for that
action itself would be void.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals was correct that because there was no proper intervention
by Clyde Snow and no waiver, all post-judgment orders by the district court were void
and that Boyle, as a nonparty to the underlying action, did not have an appeal of right.
As a result, the court could not rule on the merits and arguments pertaining to the
district court's findings regarding Clyde Snow's lien and the disbursement of funds
because it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits and arguments and dismissed the
appeal. After a review of the record, the Supreme Court should dismiss. The 3rd
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District Court in the current matter Clyde Snow & Sessions, PC v. Thomas D. Boyle, et
al, No.160903744 has jurisdiction over Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Woodson in enforcing
Clyde Snow's lien.
Based on the facts and arguments set forth above, the Boyle respectfully requests
that this Court dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in granting of a writ of certiorari to gain
jurisdiction over a nonparty where there was a void judgment and allow the civil action
in the district court to proceed.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 23 day ofDecember2016.

Thomas D. Boyle
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